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Regulators are requiring banks to raise additional equity to
finance their activities. The benefits are understood in terms of
reducing the risks of another financial crisis. But there are potential
costs, including the potential for unanticipated macroeconomic
impacts as banks reduce leverage. We use a financial computable
general equilibrium model, containing disaggregated treatment of
financial agents, to explore the economy-wide consequences of an
increase in bank capital adequacy ratios. We find that the
macroeconomic consequences are small.
I Introduction
Following the events of 2008 and their after-
math, regulators have focused on reducing the
risks of another financial crisis. Policies affecting
commercial bank leverage are viewed as impor-
tant instruments in this regard. This follows from
an understanding that thin levels of loss-absorb-
ing equity played an important role in raising
counterparty risk perceptions in an environment
of falling bank asset values, thus impairing bank
wholesale debt finance markets during the crisis.
As described by the International Monetary Fund
(2009), after a year of slow growth among
developed economies and growing concerns
about US mortgage markets, the Lehman Brothers
default in late 2008 caused a swift deterioration in
financial market conditions. Counterparty risk
perceptions peaked as bank asset values were
written down, the US federal government under-
wrote shortfalls in AIG’s capacity to honour its
insurance obligations, and a number of private
and semi-private financial institutions in the USA
and Europe received public financial support
(International Monetary Fund, 2009).
The crisis in financial markets quickly spilled
into the real economy. The International Mone-
tary Fund reduced its global real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth forecast in April 2009 to
1.3 per cent (International Monetary Fund,
2009, p. xii), but the realised growth rate for the
year was ultimately lower still, at 1.7 per cent
(United Nations, 2015). These global figures
obscure the severe impacts in countries most
directly affected by the crisis. Edey (2014) notes
that US output fell by 4 per cent in the year to
June 2009, and that the peak-to-trough falls in
output in the UK and the euro area were 7 per cent
and 6 per cent, respectively. Sharp falls in
household wealth compounded the pain of declin-
ing real incomes and employment.
Atkinson et al. (2013) argue that the benefits of
avoiding financial crises can be understood in
terms of avoiding their impacts on employment
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and national income. They estimate US losses
from the crisis at between 40 and 90 per cent of a
year’s output, or around $50,000–$120,000 per
household. Similar magnitudes were forecast by
Dixon and Rimmer (2011) (59 per cent of a year’s
worth of private consumption) and Dixon and
Rimmer (2013) (44 per cent of a year’s worth of
employment). Atkinson et al. argue that such
estimates are helpful because they provide a
measure of the potential benefits against which
the costs of regulations aimed at avoiding future
crises can be weighed. For example, Menzies
et al. (2016) argue that because the costs of
financial crises are potentially very high relative
to the costs imposed by regulation, and because
the effectiveness of each independent regulation
cannot be known with certainty, a policy bias in
favour of apparent regulation duplication in the
financial sector is warranted.
While Australia was spared economic damage of
the magnitudes visited on the USA and Europe, it
was not immune. Real GDP fell 0.8 per cent in the
third quarter of 2008, but then grew slowly in the
following three quarters, providing a low but
positive growth rate of 1.1 per cent for the year to
September 2009. The unemployment rate
increased by approximately 1.5 percentage points,
rising from 4.3 per cent in September 2008, to 5.7
per cent by September 2009, with a peak in the
intervening quarters of 5.9 per cent. Edey (2014)
argues that a factor that insulated Australia from
the worst effects of the financial crisis, in addition
to fortuitous strength in the terms of trade, was
effective leadership by the Australian Prudential
Regulatory Authority (APRA). This saw Aus-
tralian banks enter the crisis with reasonable
capital buffers and sound asset positions that were
not subject to material price impairments.
Consistent with its statutory purpose of pro-
moting financial system stability, APRA contin-
ues to monitor and regulate the proportion of
commercial bank activities financed by equity. In
July 2015 it released the results of its comparative
study of the capital ratios of Australian and
international banks. It noted that the capital ratios
of Australia’s major banks were approximately
200 basis points short of levels necessary to place
them in the top quartile of their international
peers. This has generated policy action in the
form of mandating increased risk weights on
residential mortgages from July 2016, and a
signal of intention over the next several years to
see capital adequacy ratios rise by about 200 basis
points.
While regulators understand the consequences
of alternative capital adequacy ratios for financial
sector resilience under various stress test scenar-
ios, and understand the potential wider economic
benefits in terms of avoiding economic damage on
the scale experienced during the financial crisis,
policy-makers are less certain about the economic
costs of mandating rises in bank equity capital. At
one end of the spectrum, commentary from the
banking industry warns that, by raising the share
of bank activity financed by equity, which carries
a higher required rate of return than debt, the cost
of bank finance will increase, reducing interest-
sensitive expenditures, such as investment (e.g.
Pandit, 2010). At the other end of the spectrum,
assessments by economists emphasise the theo-
retical basis for expecting that the cost of bank
finance should be less sensitive to capital struc-
ture than suggested by the banking industry. For
example, Miles et al. (2012) note that the
Modigliani–Miller theorem implies that the cost
of bank finance should be invariant to the share of
equity in bank finance: as the equity share rises,
the volatility of the equity return falls and the
security of the debt return rises, causing the
required return on both forms of finance to fall
and leaving the weighted average cost of bank
capital (WACC) unchanged. However Baker and
Wurgler (2015) argue that this overlooks the
‘low-risk anomaly’, namely the failure of the
empirical risk–return regularity that holds
between asset classes (i.e. returns on higher-risk
asset classes exceed returns on lower-risk asset
classes) to hold within the equity asset class
(where the risk–return relationship is flat or
inverted). They show that the low-risk anomaly
holds for banks, and argue that the significance of
this for regulators is that a mandated rise in bank
capital might, by lowering bank risk, raise rather
than lower the required return on bank equity,
thus causing the WACC to rise.1
Measures of the macroeconomic effects of a
rise in bank capital also vary widely. Modelling
by the Institute of International Finance (2011)
anticipated large GDP losses from the implemen-
tation of Basel III capital requirements and
1 As discussed in Section II, our model contains a
mechanism that contributes to such an effect: a finan-
cial agent, seeking to expand its issuance of a particular
liability instrument (such as equity), must raise the rate
of return on the instrument in order to induce other
agents to hold more of it on the asset side of their
balance sheets.
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regulatory standards, of the order of 3.2 per cent
relative to baseline. However, modelling coordi-
nated by the Bank for International Settlements
(2010a,b) of a 1 percentage point increase in the
capital adequacy ratio, phased over four to eight
years, found more modest impacts, with a range
of GDP troughs of between 0.05 per cent and 0.3
per cent at the end of the implementation periods.
Both the IIF and BIS results were generated by
a two-step process: first, the effects of higher
capital requirements on bank spreads and lending
volumes were estimated; second, these were input
as exogenous shocks to macroeconomic models.
In the modelling we present in this paper, we
combine these two steps. We construct a model of
the financial sector in which the banking sector is
one of a number of financial agents, and integrate
the model of the financial sector within a com-
prehensive model of the Australian economy. In
this way, the capital adequacy ratio is just one of
many exogenous variables in a large economy-
wide model. When we shock this variable, the
impact on bank lending costs and credit volumes
is determined endogenously along with outcomes
for policy-relevant variables such as employment
and GDP. We find GDP impacts that are lower
than those reported by IIF, and lower even than
approximately 85 per cent of the results found by
BIS. As we shall argue, the integrated approach,
as opposed to the two-stage approach, provides
opportunities for damage-mitigating economic
mechanisms (such as substitution away from
bank finance) to take effect.
To explore the economy-wide effects of higher
bank capital requirements we raise the banking
sector’s capital adequacy ratio by 100 basis
points.2 Our simulation is undertaken using a
version of the financial computable general equi-
librium (FCGE) model described in Dixon et al.
(2015). We summarise the underlying FCGE
model in Section II. In Sections II.i and II.ii we
explain that the model’s treatment of the financial
sector is constructed in a bottom-up way; that is,
we identify individual financial agents and the
financial instruments with which they are con-
cerned, and assume that financial agents act in an
optimising manner subject to constraints. Sec-
tions II.iii and II.iv expand on developments to
the FCGE model that are relevant to the current
study; in particular, building on the Dixon et al.
(2015) model, we develop the manner in which
we model the banking sector (particularly as it
relates to the capital adequacy ratio and risk
weights on assets held by banks), and describe
central bank setting of the policy rate via a Taylor
rule. Section III describes the simulations we
have undertaken with the model and what we
learn from them. Section IV concludes.
II The Financial Computable General
Equilibrium Model
In this section we provide a summary of the
FCGE model used in the simulations described in
Section III. For a detailed discussion of the
model, see Dixon et al. (2015). As we shall
describe, the FCGE model is based on identifica-
tion of many agents and the optimising behaviour
governing their actions. Out of this framework
emerge a number of transmission channels via
which a change in commercial bank capital
requirements can affect activity in the real
economy. We go on to describe the features of
the FCGE model that are important in the
simulation of the effects of a rise in capital
adequacy ratios.
(i) Overview of the Financial CGE Model
While fully integrated, the FCGE model can be
broadly conceived as comprised of two parts:
 a traditional CGE model describing the real
side of the economy; and
 a model of the interactions between financial
agents and their links with the real side of the
economy.
The real side of the FCGE model is largely as
described in Dixon and Rimmer (2002). It iden-
tifies:
 106 industries, using inputs to produce 106 com-
modities for use in current production, capital
formation, private consumption, public consump-
tion, and export. Each industry is modelled as an
optimiser, using domestic and imported intermedi-
ate inputs, labour, capital and land, in a cost-
minimising fashion, to produce output. In choosing
cost-minimising input combinations, each industry
adjusts its input ratios in response to changes in the
relative prices of intermediate inputs and primary
factors.
 106 industry-specific investors, producing
physical capital for installation in each
2 To put this in context, this is a movement in bank
capital adequacy of the same size as that investigated
by Bank for International Settlements (2010a,b), and
half that (200 basis points) foreshadowed as possible in
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (2015).
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industry. Like the current producers identified
above, investors act in an optimising fashion,
adjusting their use of source-specific inputs in
response to changes in relative prices in order
to produce given quantities of new units of
industry-specific physical capital in a cost-
minimising way. In determining how many new
units of physical capital to install in each
industry, investors are guided by movements in
expected rates of return on physical capital
relative to the cost of securing financial capital.
 A representative household, purchasing domes-
tic and imported commodities for private con-
sumption. Households act as optimisers,
maximising utility by choosing between alter-
native source-specific commodities subject to
an aggregate consumption constraint.
 A government sector, purchasing domestic
and imported commodities for public con-
sumption.
 A foreign sector, purchasing units of domestic
production to be sold in foreign markets subject
to price-sensitive constant elasticity export
demand curves, and supplying imports to Aus-
tralia at exogenous foreign currency prices.
 Providers of 10 margin services (trade, trans-
port, insurance and other margins), required to
facilitate flows of commodities between pro-
ducers, importers, households, government,
investors and foreign agents in export markets.
Movements in relative prices reconcile the
demand and supply sides of most commodity
and factor markets through market clearing
conditions. An important exception is the
labour market, which is assumed to experience
sticky wages in the short run, but to transition in
the long run to an environment of wage flexi-
bility and a given natural rate of unemployment.
Zero pure profit conditions in current produc-
tion and capital formation determine basic
prices (prices at the factory door) for domesti-
cally produced output. Purchaser prices differ
from basic prices by the value of margin
services and indirect taxes. In addition to
indirect taxes, government revenue from direct
taxes is identified, as are a variety of govern-
ment outlays beyond public consumption
spending (such as personal benefit payments
and public investment). Together with variables
describing foreign transfer payments, this pro-
vides sufficient detail for the identification of
the government borrowing requirement, house-
hold disposable income, and household savings.
Real-side CGE models with characteristics
such as those described above have been used
for many decades to answer diverse policy
questions (Dixon & Rimmer, 2016). However,
they are silent on, or treat implicitly, the question
of how a number of important transactions are
financed. For example, how is investment spend-
ing financed? How does the cost of financial
capital affect the decision to invest in physical
capital? Who is financing the public sector
borrowing requirement (PSBR)? How is the
current account deficit (CAD) financed? Who
decides on how household savings are allocated?
An important role of the financial part of the
FCGE model is to answer these and related
questions.
The model’s financial equation block identifies
five financial instruments and 11 financial
agents.3 Each financial agent is concerned with
both the asset and the liability/equity sides of its
balance sheet. Hereafter, we refer to financial
agents as ‘asset agents’ in matters concerned with
the asset sides of their balances sheets, and as
‘liability agents’ in matters concerned with the
liability and equity sides of their balance sheets.
The core of the FCGE model is three arrays and
the equations describing how the values in these
arrays change through time. The three arrays are:
F(s,f,d), which is the flow of net new holdings by
asset agent d (e.g. households, the banking sector)
of financial instrument f (e.g. equity, loans,
bonds) issued by liability agent s (e.g. govern-
ment, industry); R(s,f,d), which is the power of the
rate of return (i.e. 1 plus the rate) on financial
instrument f issued by liability agent s and held as
an asset by agent d; and A(s,f,d), which is holdings
by asset agent d of financial instrument f issued
by liability agent s.
Insights into the relative importance of alterna-
tive financing sources for a given agent can be had
through evaluation of S
ðLÞ
ðs;f ;dÞ ¼ Aðs;f ;dÞ=
P
fP
d Aðs;f ;dÞ, the share of agent s’s financial capital
3 The financial instruments are: cash, deposits/loans,
bonds, equity, gold and SDRs. The financial agents are:
commercial banks, the central bank, foreigners, gov-
ernment, households, industries, non-bank financial
intermediaries, superannuation, life insurance, non-
reproducible housing, and reproducible housing.
Throughout this paper, our set element naming con-
ventions for these instruments and agents are, respec-
tively: Cash, DepLoan, Bonds, Equity, GldSDR; and
ComB, CenB, Foreign, Gov, Hhold, Inds, NBFI, Super,
LifeIns, NRH and RH.
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raised from agent d via instrument f. The relative
importance of alternative assets in an agent’s
portfolio can be understood through evaluation of
S
ðAÞ
ðs;f ;dÞ ¼ Aðs;f ;dÞ=
P
s
P
f Aðs;f ;dÞ, the share of agent
d’s portfolio represented by holdings of instrument
f issued by agent s. For example, evaluation of
S
ðLÞ
ðSuper;f ;dÞ for all f and d reveals that the superan-
nuation sector is nearly wholly equity-financed by
the Australian household sector (i.e.
S
ðLÞ
ðSuper;Equity;HholdÞ ¼ 0:995.4 Similarly, evaluation
of S
ðLÞ
ðInds;f ;dÞ provides insights into the relative
importance of alternative financing sources for
industry. In the model’s initial year, the top four
values for S
ðLÞ
ðInds;f ;dÞ are S
ðLÞ
ðInds;DepLoan;ComBÞ ¼ 0:23,
S
ðLÞ
ðInds;Equity;ForeignÞ ¼ 0:22, SðLÞðInds;Equity;HholdÞ ¼ 0:19
and S
ðLÞ
ðInds;Equity;SuperÞ ¼ 0:10. Aggregating over
funding agents, we see the relative importance of
equity, intermediated loans and bonds in financing
Australian industries in the values
S
ðLÞ
ðInds;Equity:Þ ¼ 0:58, SðLÞðInds;DepLoan:Þ ¼ 0:35 and
S
ðLÞ
ðInds;Bonds:Þ ¼ 0:07. These figures point to bank
lending as an important, but not dominant, form of
financing for Australian industry. As we shall
argue in Section III, this provides scope for
industry to substitute away from bank finance
when its relative cost increases. However, an
important caveat is aggregation. Within the finan-
cial part of the FCGE model, the activity of
financing capital formation by the model’s indus-
tries, excluding housing, is undertaken by one
aggregate liability agent. In effect, all industries
are assumed to have the same balance sheet
structure. A more disaggregated model might
reveal subsector-specific detail in which bank
finance is the dominant source of financial capital.5
Nevertheless, our model is sufficiently disaggre-
gated to recognise the importance of bank financ-
ing of housing. We divide housing into two sectors:
‘reproducible’ (RH) and ‘non-reproducible’
(NRH). We have undertaken this division both
to facilitate modelling in the present paper of the
distinction between financing new housing con-
struction and financing the existing housing
stock, and in anticipation of future model appli-
cations concerned with property price bubbles.
For NRH (established inner-city dwellings) it is
conceivable that asset prices can depart from
construction costs. For RH (apartments, units,
and houses outside the inner city) construction
and land preparation costs should anchor asset
prices. On the asset side of their balance sheets,
both agents hold the value of physical housing
assets, but no financial capital (i.e. A(s,f,NR) =
A(s,f,NRH) = 0). Equity financing is important for
both agents, but more so for the NRH agent which
holds the housing stock in established neighbour-
hoods: S
ðLÞ
ðRH;Equity;HholdÞ ¼ 0:32, SðNRH;Equity;
HholdÞðLÞ ¼ 0:60. Bank debt financing is important
for both agents, but more so for the newer
houses underlying RH: S
ðLÞ
ðRH;DepLoan;ComBÞ ¼ 0:52,
S
ðLÞ
ðNRH;DepLoan;ComBÞ ¼ 0:30.
With details of S
ðLÞ
ðs;f ;ComBÞ and S
ðAÞ
ðComB;f ;dÞ, our
FCGE model effectively carries a bank lending
channel, that is, a description of the role that banks
play as intermediaries for different parts of the
economy. As Kashyap and Stein (1994) note,
summarising Bernanke and Blinder (1988), three
conditions must hold for a model to possess a
distinct lending channel: (i) liability agents must
view as imperfect substitutes financial capital raised
by loans from banks and raised from other sources;
(ii) banks must view deposit finance and other forms
of finance as imperfect substitutes; and (iii) there
must be a nominal rigidity that prevents monetary
shocks from having no impact on the real economy.
All three conditions hold in the FCGE model.
Condition (i) ensures that borrowers cannot entirely
offset a rise in the cost of bank funds by shifting to
other sources of financial capital. Condition (ii)
renders the cost of funds to commercial banks
sensitive to changes in the costs of particular finance
sources by ensuring that they cannot make costless
switches between alternative funding sources. Con-
dition (iii) ensures that changes in monetary policy
are not immediately neutralised by costless price
adjustment. These three conditions hold in the
FCGE model, thus allowing a shock directed at
commercial banks (such as a rise in the capital
adequacy ratio) to exert an influence on the cost of
financial capital to agents reliant on bank finance
(such as housing construction).
4 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014), the primary
source for A(s,f,d), records a small value for non-equity
financing of superannuation.
5 For example, the recent Financial System Inquiry
argued that development of the corporate bond market
should be a priority (see http://fsi.gov.au/publications/
interim-report/03-funding/the-corporate-bond-market/
). Ralston and Jenkinson (2014) discuss sector-specific
difficulties in sourcing funds by small and medium
enterprises.
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(ii) Agent Decision-Making and Links between
the Model’s Real and Financial Sides
Financial agents are assumed to be constrained
optimisers. Broadly, in their capacity as liability
agents, they are assumed to issue the mix of
financial instruments that minimises the cost of
servicing the total liabilities they require, subject
to a constraint that prevents them moving to
corner solutions in the issuance of particular
financial instruments to particular asset agents.
Similarly, in their capacity as asset agents,
financial agents are assumed to hold the mix of
financial instruments that maximises the return
from their portfolio of financial assets, subject to
a constraint that prevents them moving to corner
solutions in the holding of particular financial
instruments issued by particular liability agents.
More formally, we assume that domestic lia-
bility agent s, constrained by a need to raise a
given amount of funds, aims to minimise a
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) func-
tion in which the arguments are values for end-of-
year liabilities weighted by the powers of the
rates of return paid on those liabilities. That is,
we assume that domestic liability agent s chooses
AT1(s,f,d) for all f, d to
minimise ZðLÞs ¼ CET

AT1ðs;f ;dÞ  Rðs;f ;dÞ;
8f ; dðs 2 LALFÞ
subject to
X
f
X
d
½AT1ðs;f ;dÞ  AT0ðs;f ;dÞ
 Vðs;f ;dÞ ¼ NEWLIABðsÞ
ð1Þ
TABLE 1
Balance Sheet Closures and Agent-Specific Financial/Real-Side Links
Financial agent (A) New liabilities (NEWLIAB(s)) (B) New assets (NEWASSET(d))
1. Commercial
banks
Equal to new financial asset acquisitions Purchases of new financial assets
endogenous via fixed mark-up rule on
cost of financial capital
2. Central bank Equal to new asset acquisitions. Exchange
settlement balances (commercial bank deposits
with the central bank) exogenous
Government bond purchases endogenous
(via policy rule). Holdings of other
assets exogenous
3. Foreigners Foreign financial assets are available for
purchase by domestic asset agents at given
rates of return
Purchases of domestic assets by
foreigners = CAD + purchases of foreign
assets by domestic agents
4. Government Equal to PSBR plus purchase of new financial
assets by government
Purchases of new financial assets by
government indexed to growth in
nominal GDP
5. Households Mortgage liabilities are issued directly by agents
(10) and (11). Business liabilities are issued
directly by agent (6). Hence no new liabilities
Purchases of new financial assets
(including superannuation equity) equal
to household savings (inclusive of
superannuation contributions)
6. Industries Equal to gross fixed capital formation plus
purchases of new financial assets
Purchases of new financial assets indexed
to nominal GDP
7. Non-bank
financial institutions
Equal to new financial asset acquisitions Purchases of new financial assets
endogenous via fixed mark-up rule on
cost of financial capital
8. Superannuation New liabilities (equity held by households) are a
fixed proportion of annual economy-wide wage
bill
Equal to new liabilities
9. Life insurance Equal to new financial asset acquisitions Purchases of new financial assets
endogenous via fixed mark-up rule on
cost of financial capital
10. Non-reproducible
housing
No new financial liabilities No new financial assets
11. Reproducible
housing
Equal to gross fixed capital formation in the
dwellings sector
No new financial assets
Note: Shaded cells are directly determined by the real economy.
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where LALF denotes liability agents less foreign,
that is, all liability agents excluding foreigners;
AT1(s,f,d) is the end-of-year value of liability
instrument f issued by agent s and held as an asset
by agent d; AT0(s,f,d) is the start-of-year value of
liability instrument f issued by agent s and held as
an asset by agent d; R(s,f,d) is the power (1 plus the
rate) of the return on instrument f issued by agent
s and held as an asset by agent d; V(s,f,d) is a
revaluation term; ZðLÞs are agent-specific CET
functions; and NEWLIAB(s) are the new liabili-
ties that must be raised by agent s (see Table 1).
Domestic asset agents are assumed to choose
an allocation of their end-of-year portfolio across
domestic and foreign assets in order to maximise
a function in which the arguments are end-of-year
asset allocations weighted by rates of return.
Specifically, we assume that domestic asset opti-
mising agent d chooses AT1(s,f,d) for all s, f to
maximise Z
ðAÞ
ðdÞ ¼ CES

AT1ðs;f ;dÞ
 Rðs;f ;dÞ; 8s; f
ðd 2 AALFÞ
subject to
X
s
X
f
½AT1ðs;f ;dÞ  AT0ðs;f ;dÞ  Vðs;f ;dÞ
¼ NEWASSETðdÞ ð2Þ
where AALF denotes asset agents less foreign,
that is, the set of domestic asset agents6 ;
NEWASSET(d) is net new acquisitions of finan-
cial assets by agent d (see Table 1); Z
ðAÞ
ðdÞ are
agent-specific constant elasticity of substitution
functions; and R(s,f,d), AT1(s,f,d), AT0(s,f,d), V(s,f,d)
are as previously defined.
Converting the solutions to these optimisation
problems into percentage change form, we have a
set of return-sensitive supply equations (govern-
ing the issuance of financial instruments by
liability agents) and return-sensitive demand
equations (governing the demand for financial
instruments by asset agents) of the form
at1ðs;f ;dÞ ¼ liabilitiesðsÞ  sðsÞ rðs;f ;dÞ  waccðsÞ
 
ðs 2 LALFÞ
ð3Þ
at1ðs;f ;dÞ ¼ assetsðdÞ  rðdÞ rðs;f ;dÞ  averorðdÞ
 
ðd 2 AALFÞ
ð4Þ
where at1(s,f,d) and r(s,f,d) are percentage changes
in AT1(s,f,d) and R(s,f,d), respectively; liabilities(s)
and assets(d) are percentage changes in the end-
of-year total liabilities and total assets of agents s
and d, respectively7; wacc(s) is the percentage
change in the weighted average cost of capital for
agent s8 ; averor(d) is the percentage change in the
weighted average return on agent d’s portfolio9;
and s(s) and r(d) are positive parameters govern-
ing the elasticity of capital structure and asset al-
location shares to movements in relative rates of
return. Broadly, the solution to the financial
instrument supply and demand equations given
by (3) and (4) determine movements in rates of
return across financial instruments.10
In describing (1)–(4), we omitted liability and
asset decision-making by foreign agents. We
assume that the liabilities of foreign agents are
available to Australian asset agents at given rates
of return. That is, r(Foreign,f,d), for all f, d 2 AALF,
is exogenous. Foreign asset agents solve a prob-
lem like (2) but are concerned with the allocation
of their foreign currency portfolios across global
assets in foreign currency terms. This results in
equations describing foreign demand for Aus-
tralian dollar assets of the form
at1ðs;f ;ForeignÞ þ / ¼ fassetsfc
þrðForeignÞ rðs;f ;ForeignÞ  averorfor
  ð5Þ
where / is the percentage change in the nominal
exchange rate (expressed as foreign currency
6 The foreign asset agent solves a similar problem,
but is concerned with the foreign currency values of its
asset holdings. As we shall describe, this allows
endogenous determination of the nominal exchange
rate.
7 Defined as ∑f,dAT0(s,f,d)  V(s,f,d) + NEWLIAB(s)
and ∑s,fAT0(s,f,d)  V(s,f,d) + NEWASSET(d), respec-
tively.
8 Defined as
P
f ;d Rðs;f ;dÞ  AT1ðs;f ;dÞ=
P
k;t
h
AT0ðs;k;tÞ  Vðs;k;tÞ þ NEWLIABðsÞ.
9 Defined as
P
s;f Rðs;f ;dÞ  AT1ðs;f ;dÞ=
P
k;t AT0ðk;t;dÞ
h
Vðk;t;dÞ þ NEWLIABðdÞ.
10 The exceptions are rates of return on foreign liabilities
(exogenous)andtherateof returnoncash(exogenousonzero).
The supply of these liabilities is determined by demand. Rates
of return on bank exchange settlement deposits/loans with the
central bank are determined by supply/demand conditions in
these markets, but the supply/demand conditions are adjusted
by the central bank to ensure that rate of return outcomes are
consistent with the policy rule (see Section II.iv).
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units per domestic currency unit); fassetsfc is the
percentage change in the foreign currency value
of the foreign agent’s global portfolio of financial
assets; and averorfor is the percentage change in
the average rate of return on the foreign agent’s
global portfolio of assets.
In this equation fassetsfc and averorfor are
determined by factors outside Australia and are
therefore exogenous in a model of Australia. As
with other rates of return, r(s,f,Foreign) is deter-
mined by the interaction of demand and supply, in
this case foreign demand for particular Australian
assets and the willingness of Australian financial
agents to supply the underlying liabilities. With
appropriate weights the sum of the at1(s,f,Foreign)
over s and f reflects the CAD which must be
financed by foreigners. This makes (5) an avenue
for determining /.
Endogenous determination of / in this way is a
significant addition to the CGE framework. In a
traditional real-side CGE model concerned with
short-run employment and other effects of policy
shocks, real wages are assumed to be sticky (or
fixed) and the domestic price level is arbitrary. To
tie down the price level, a nominal variable must be
exogenous. A common choice is /. In the jargon of
CGE modelling, / acts as the numeraire. If the
nominal exchange rate is increased by 1 per cent
(/ = 1) then all domestic prices and other nominal
variables decrease by 1 per cent with no effect on
any real variables.11 Now when we add a beha-
vioural equation such as (5) for foreign financiers
of the CAD, we can replace the sticky real wage
equation with a sticky nominalwage equationmore
in keeping with macroeconomic theory (e.g. a
Philips curve) and allow (5) to determine /
endogenously.12 Thus with the addition of Equa-
tion (5), / and the domestic price level can be
determined endogenously, doing away with the
concept of the numeraire. This enriches the CGE
framework by linking the monetary and real sides
of the economy, extending the range of CGE
analysis to include monetary phenomena.
In our discussion of the optimisation problems
to this point, we have taken as given the
constraints faced by each agent. We now consider
how these constraints are determined. In so doing,
we discuss the connections between the asset and
liability sides of agent-specific balance sheets,
and the points of connection between the model’s
financial and real sides. As summarised in
Table 1, there are seven ways in which asset
and liability sides of agent-specific balance sheets
are determined: (i) via a connection with the real
economy (cells B3, A4, B5, A6, A8, A11); (ii) via
a mark-up rule on financial capital costs (cells B1,
B7, B9); (iii) via a balance sheet constraint (cells
A1, A2, A7, A9, B8); (iv) via an indexing rule
with nominal GDP (cells B4, B6); (v) via passive
adjustment to demand (cell A3); (vi) via a policy
rule (cell B2); or (vii) exogenous and zero (cells
A5, A10, B10, B11). We expand below.
The main points of interaction between the real
and financial sides of the FCGE model are B3, A4,
B5, A6, A8, and A11, covering the model’s two key
saving agents (foreigners and households, cells B3,
B5), three key borrowing agents (government, and
the two investment financing agents, industry and
RH, cells A4, A6, A11) and superannuation contri-
butions (cell A8). We consider these cells in turn.
Foreign purchases of domestic financial assets (B3)
are largely determined by the current account
financing requirement, which in turn is largely
determined in the model’s real side via the outcome
for the balance of trade. Household savings are
determined in themodel’s real side as the difference
between household disposable income and nominal
consumption. This determines household pur-
chases of financial assets (cell B5). The PSBR is
determined in themodel’s real side as the difference
between public expenditure and taxation and other
revenues. This largely determines government
liability issuance (cell A4). The desirability of
undertaking gross fixed capital formation in the
dwellings and non-dwellings sectors is governed by
the value of the weighted average cost of financial
capital to each sector relative to sector-specific
values of the ratio of the value of the marginal
product of physical capital to the cost of new
physical capital. This determines liability issuance
by the RH sector (cell A11) and largely determines
liability issuance by industries (cell A6). Superan-
nuation contributions (new liabilities for these
funds, cell A8) are modelled as a fixed proportion
of the national wage bill, which in turn is largely
11 Other common choices for the numeraire are the
Consumer Price Index, the nominal wage rate and the
price deflator for GDP. The choice is unimportant. The
numeraire determines the absolute price level and has
no effect on relative prices or real variables.
12 A traditional real-side CGE model can have a
sticky nominal wage equation instead of a sticky real
wage equation, but to close such a model we still need
an arbitrary assumption for a nominal variable. In other
words, a sticky nominal wage equation by itself does
not determine the price level, real wages or employ-
ment.
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determined by employment and wage conditions in
the model’s real side.
We now discuss each agent’s balance sheet
closure rule, proceeding row by row through
Table 1. We begin with the three pure financial
intermediaries (rows 1, 7, 9), for whom NEW-
ASSET(d) and NEWLIAB(s) are determined via a
fixed mark-up on the cost of their financial capital
(cells B1, B7, B9) and a balance sheet constraint
(cells A1, A7, A9). Under this closure, if a financial
intermediary (e.g. commercial bank) sees a rise in
the return on a particular financial asset (e.g. loans
to housing), then the intermediary expands pur-
chases of the asset, financing this through new
liabilities (e.g. loans from foreigners). Via the
fixed mark-up constraint, equilibrium is achieved
via upward pressure on the cost of the financial
intermediary’s capital, and downward pressure on
returns earned on the financial asset.
Row 2 summarises the closure of the central
bank. Asset purchases by the central bank are
exogenous for all assets other than domestic
government bonds and loans to commercial
banks.13 As we discuss in Section II.iv, bond
purchases, representing open market operations,
adjust endogenously in order to maintain the
policy rate as determined by inflation and unem-
ployment conditions. Central bank asset pur-
chases are financed by issuing central bank
liabilities in the form of cash and loans from
government (B2).14 The government’s equity in
the central bank is revalued in line with move-
ments in central bank asset valuations.15
As already discussed, foreign purchases of
domestic assets are determined by the CAD
financing requirement (cell B3). We assume that
the liabilities of the foreign agent are available
for purchase by domestic asset agents at given
rates of return (cell A3).
Row 4 describes local, state and federal gov-
ernment purchases of financial assets and issu-
ance of financial liabilities. We index new
government purchases of financial assets to
movements in nominal GDP (cell B4).16 Govern-
ment issuance of new liabilities (primarily bonds)
is equal to the PSBR plus government purchases
of new financial assets (cell A4).
Purchases of new financial assets by household
(cell B5) are equal to household savings. An
important component of household savings is
superannuation. Acquisition of equity in the super-
annuation sector is set at a fixed proportion of the
national wage bill (cell A8).17 The household is not
modelled as owing debt directly.18 Mortgage debt
is owed by the RH and NRH agents (rows 10 and
11). Business debt is issued by the industry agent
(row 6). The household’s ownership interests in
sectors (6), (10) and (11) are recognised via equity.
The industry agent (row 6) is responsible for
financing non-housing investment. As such, its
issuance of new liabilities is equal to the value of
non-housing gross fixed capital formation plus
purchases by industry of financial assets (cell
A6). Financial asset purchases by industry are
determined by an indexing relationship with
nominal GDP (cell B6).
Issuance of liabilities (equity held by house-
holds) by the superannuation sector is modelled as
a fixed proportion of the national wage bill (cell
A8). These new liabilities finance asset accumula-
tion by the superannuation sector (cell B8).
The RH sector is responsible for construction
of new dwellings (cell A11). Issuance of new
13 Central bank loans to commercial banks are also
exogenous, but the constraint is imposed not on central
bank supply of the loans, but on commercial bank
demand for the loans. In the model’s database, central
bank loans to commercial banks represent loans of
exchange settlement balances. We model the central
bank as supplying these loans at an interest rate
(R(ComB,DepLoan,CenB)) that is 50 basis points higher
than the rate offered on exchange settlement balances
(R(CenB,DepLoan,ComB)). Nevertheless, supply of the
loans is constrained by our assumption that commercial
bank demand for the loans is exogenous.
14 Cash and loans from government comprise the
bulk of central bank liabilities (S
ðLÞ
ðCenB;Cash;Þþ
S
ðLÞ
ðCenB;DepLoan;GovÞ ¼ 0:60þ 0:23 ¼ 0:83). The remainder
comprises government equity (S
ðLÞ
ðCenB;Equity;GovÞ ¼ 0:12)
and deposits by banks (S
ðLÞ
ðCenB;DepLoan;ComBÞ ¼ 0:05).
15 Largely caused by exchange rate driven movement
in the value of the central bank’s foreign asset holdings.
16 Government financial assets include such things as
central bank deposits and equity, receivables, and
domestic and foreign financial asset holdings to match
future liabilities (e.g. the Future Fund).
17 Hence we exclude household allocations to
AT1(Super,Equity,Hhold) from the household’s decision
problem (2).
18 A comparison of household debt in ABS 6554.0
and ABS 5232.0 indicates that consumer debt is less
than 4 per cent of the total household debt in ABS
5232.0. The remainder is mortgage and business debt.
We model mortgage and business debt as issued by the
model’s industry and housing agents. We do not model
consumer debt.
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liabilities by the RH sector is determined by the
value of gross fixed capital formation in the
model’s dwellings sector. We model the NRH
sector as owning the physical assets representing
that part of the dwellings sector capital stock
designated as non-reproducible, and as responsi-
ble for the debt and equity underlying the
financing of this stock. Because the sector
undertakes no new housing construction (this is
the responsibility of the RH sector) it does not
issue new financial liabilities (cell A10).19
(iii) Modelling the Capital Adequacy Ratio
Capital adequacy ratios impose additional
constraints on the behaviour of banks. First, bank
decision making over asset ownership must
recognise differences in capital requirements
across assets carrying different risk weights.
Second, movements in the capital adequacy ratio
affect the amount of equity banks use to finance
their operations. We expand below.
We begin bymodifying the FCGEmodel’s standard
theory (givenbyEqn 2) governingdecision-makingby
asset agents. We assume that commercial banks
(ComB) choose their end-of-year asset portfolio,
AT1(s,f,ComB) for all s and f, to maximise
CESðRðs;f ;ComBÞAT1ðs;f ;ComBÞ;for all s and f Þ
subjecttoX
s;f
AT1ðs;f ;ComBÞ¼BBðComBÞ
andX
d
AT1ðComB;Equity;dÞ
¼max
X
d
A1ðComB;Equity;dÞ;CAR
X
s;f
RISKWGTðs;f Þ

AT1ðs;f ;ComBÞ

ð6Þ
where CAR is the capital adequacy ratio,
RISKWGT(s,f) is the risk weight that the financial
regulator assigns to AT1(s,f,ComB), A1

ðComB;Equity;dÞ
is the value of equity the commercial banks would
have on issue in the absence of capital adequacy
requirements, BB(ComB) is the total value of
commercial bank assets (equal to
NEWASSETðComBÞ þ
P
s;f
AT0s;f ;ComB  Vðs;f ;ComBÞ.
We assume that the CAR constraint is binding soX
d
AT1ðComB;Equity;dÞ ¼ CAR 
X
s;f
RISKWGTðs;f Þ
 AT1ðs;f ;ComBÞ
Equity liabilities are relatively expensive.
Consequently, we approximate problem (6) as
choose AT1ðs;f ;ComBÞfor allsandf ;
to maximise
CESðNRðs;f ;ComBÞ  A1ðs;f ;ComBÞ; for all s and f Þ
ð7Þ
subject toX
s;f
AT1ðs;f ;ComBÞ ¼ BBðComBÞ; ð8Þ
where
NRðs;f ;ComBÞ ¼ Rðs;f ;ComBÞ  w  CAR 
RISKWGTðs;f Þ
ð9Þ
and w is a positive parameter.
In (9) we recognise that the commercial banks
face a penalty when they expand their holding of
asset (s, f, ComB). The penalty is that they have to
increase expensive equity liabilities.20 We model
the penalty as proportional to the capital adequacy
ratio times the risk weight. The factor of propor-
tionality, w, reflects the difference between the
cost of equity finance to the commercial banks and
the cost of other liabilities. For example, with w at
0.08 and CAR = 0.1, the penalty for a risky asset
with weight 1 (RISKWGT = 1) would be 0.008 (80
19 But revaluation effects can alter the value of NRH
equity, and, like other liability agents, the sector is free
to adjust its capital structure in response to changes in
the relative cost of funds. At present, we revalue the
NRH sector’s physical housing assets in line with
model-determined movements in housing construction
costs. This changes the value of the household’s equity
in NRH. In future work, we hope to explore other
potential NRH price determinants, such as bubble
thinking on the part of housing investors.
20 The risk of bank equity as an investment relative
to bank deposits is reflected in initial database values
for R(ComB,Equity,d) and R(ComB,DepLoan,d), which carry
higher values for the former relative to the latter.
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basis points). This is because the acquisition of an
additional $1 of the risky asset requires that the
bank raise $0.1 of additional equity finance,
costing 800 basis points more than non-equity
finance. If the capital adequacy ratio were
increased to 0.125 then the penalty for risky assets
would increase to 0.01 (an increase of 20 basis
points), whereas the penalty for a less risky asset
(RISKWGT = 0.1, say) would barely move, from
0.0008 to 0.001 (an increase of 2 basis points). By
changing the capital adequacy ratio and/or the risk
weights the regulator can influence the asset
choices of the commercial banks. Table 2 reports
values for RISKWGT(s,f). In choosing values for
RISKWGT(s,f), we were guided by values reported
in Attachments A and D of Australian Prudential
Regulatory Authority (2013).
On the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet,
we recognise that the binding CAR constraint
determines ∑dAT1(ComB,Equity,d). Hence we
remove decision-making over equity issuance
from the bank’s liability optimisation problem,
leaving banks solving a truncated version of
Equation (1) covering non-equity liabilities only.
(iv) The Central Bank Policy Rate and the Taylor
Rule
In Section II.i we introduced data arrays
describing stocks of financial instruments (A(s,f,
d)) and the rates of return on those stocks (R(s,f,d)).
These data include five variables relevant to the
relationship between the central bank and com-
mercial banks as it pertains to the operations of
monetary policy within the FCGE model:
 A(CenB,DepLoan,ComB) and R(CenB,DepLoan,ComB),
describing commercial bank holdings of clear-
ing balances with the central bank, and the rate
of return paid by the central bank on those
balances;
 A(ComB,DepLoan,CenB) and R(ComB,DepLoan,CenB),
describing commercial bank borrowings of
clearing balances from the central bank, and
the rate of interest charged by the central bank
on those balances;
 F(Gov,Bonds,CenB), describing central bank net
purchases of domestic government bonds.
Consistent with the channel system operated by
the Australian central bank (e.g. Otto, 2007), we
begin with the idea that both R(CenB,DepLoan,ComB)
and R(ComB,DepLoan,CenB) are policy variables. We
assume that the central bank maintains a given
supply of commercial bank exchange settlement
balances (A(CenB,DepLoan,ComB)) at the rate R(CenB,
DepLoan,ComB) via open market operations in the
domestic government bond market (i.e. endoge-
nous movements in F(Gov,Bonds,CenB)).
21 We
TABLE 2
Risk Weights on Commercial Bank Assets
Parameter Description Value
RISKWGT(CenB,f) (∀ f 2 FI) Liabilities issued by the central bank 0
RISKWGT(Gov,f) (∀ f 2 FI) Liabilities issued by the domestic government 0
RISKWGT(s,Cash) (∀ s 2 LA) Cash 0
RISKWGT(s,Equity) (∀ s 2 LA) Equity 3.0
RISKWGT(Foreign,DepLoan) Loans to foreign agents 0.4
RISKWGT(Inds,DepLoan) Loans to domestic industry 0.4
RISKWGT(NBFI,DepLoan) Loans to NBFIs 0.4
RISKWGT(NRH,DepLoan) Loans to the non-reproducible housing sector 0.35
RISKWGT(RH,DepLoan) Loans to the reproducible housing sector 0.5
RISKWGT(NBFI,Bonds) Bonds issued by NBFIs 0.4
RISKWGT(Foreign,Bonds) Foreign bonds 0.4
21 This is consistent with the channel system descrip-
tion in Woodford (2003). He describes a channel system
as one in which the central bank supplies a given level
of clearing balances at a given policy interest rate, in
addition to standing ready to lend clearing balances at a
fixed spread over the policy rate (Woodford, 2003, p.
27). It is also consistent with descriptions of how the
reserve bank affects changes in the policy rate. For
example: ‘Monetary policy operates via the Bank
influencing the interest rate paid on overnight funds
(the “cash rate”). . .The Bank’s influence over the cash
rate comes from its ability to control the availability of
funds used to settle transactions between financial
institutions. By undertaking open market operations,
principally in government securities with less than one
year to maturity, the Bank controls the availability of
settlement funds and hence the interest rate paid on
overnight deposits’ (Lowe, 1995, p. 3).
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determine R(ComB,DepLoan,CenB) via R(ComB,
DepLoan,CenB) = R(CenB,DepLoan,ComB) + 0.005.
22
We endogenise R(CenB,DepLoan,ComB) by introduc-
ing a Taylor rule linking movements in the policy
rate to deviations of inflation from target and the
employment rate from the natural rate. As
described by Orphanides (2007), Taylor rules
are simple prescriptive policy rules describing
how a central bank should adjust its policy
interest rate in response to movements in inflation
and economic activity. The ‘classic Taylor rule’
(Taylor, 1993) is
r ¼ ð2þ pÞ þ 0:5ðp 2Þ þ 0:5y ð10Þ
where r is the federal funds rate, p is the rate of
inflation over the previous four quarters, ‘2’
denotes an assumed natural real rate for the
policy rate of 2 per cent (in the first bracketed
term) and a target inflation rate of 2 per cent (in
the second bracketed term), and y is an output gap
measure calculated as y = 100(Y  Y*)/Y*,
where Y* is potential real GDP.
The version of the Taylor rule we use in the
FCGE model is
RðCenB;DepLoan;ComBÞt
RðCenB;DepLoan;ComBÞt1
 	
¼ FR Pt
P
ðTÞ
t
 !a
ERt
ER
ðTÞ
t
 !1a
;
ð11Þ
where R(CenB,DepLoan,ComB)t and R(CenB,DepLoan,
ComB)t1 are the current and lagged powers of
the interest rate offered by the central bank on
settlement balances, Pt and P
ðTÞ
t are the actual and
target levels for the consumer price index in year t,
ERt, ER
ðTÞ
t are the actual and target levels of the
employment rate (1 minus the unemployment rate)
in year t, FR is an exogenous shift variable, and a is
a parameter (set at 0.5) governing the sensitivity of
interest rate movements to deviations in prices and
employment from target. The advantage of this
interpretation of the Taylor rule for our FCGE
model is that it allows for gradual adjustment of the
policy rate in response to movements in inflation
and unemployment from target, whereas (10),
unaided by an additional adjustment rule, can
produce unrealistic jumps in the policy rate.
Converting (11) to a percentage change form, we
have
rðCenB;DepLoan;ComBÞt ¼ rðCenB;DepLoan;ComBÞt1
þ0:5 pt  pðTÞt

 
þ 0:5ðert  erðTÞt Þ þ fr;
ð12Þ
where r(CenB,DepLoan,ComB)t and r(CenB,DepLoan,
ComB)t1 are the current and lagged percentage
changes in the power of the interest rate offered
by the central bank on settlement balances, pt and
p
ðTÞ
t are the actual and target rates of consumer
price inflation in year t, ert, er
ðTÞ
t are the actual and
target percentage changes in the employment rate
(1 minus the unemployment rate) in year t, and fr
is a shift variable that is endogenous when the
policy rule is inactive and exogenous (and typi-
cally unshocked) when the rule is activated.
III Simulations
(i) Simulation Design
In 2015 APRA released its comparative study
of the capital ratios of Australian banks and their
international peers. They noted that the capital
ratios of Australia’s major banks were approxi-
mately 200 basis points short of levels necessary
to place them in the top quartile of their interna-
tional peers on this measure (Australian Pruden-
tial Regulatory Authority, 2015). In the
simulations below, we raise the capital adequacy
ratio by 100 basis points. We make the following
closure assumptions:
1 We assume that the nominal wage is sticky in
the short run, but sufficiently flexible over the
medium term to ensure that the unemployment
rate returns to its natural rate.
2 Real public consumption is unaffected by the
change in the capital adequacy ratio. That is,
real public consumption follows its baseline
path. We also assume that the PSBR to GDP
ratio follows its baseline path. The exogenous
status of both public consumption and the
PSBR/GDP ratio requires flexible determina-
tion of a government revenue instrument. To
this end, we endogenously determine a direct
tax on households.
3 The policy interest rate in year t adjusts
relative to its t  1 level in response to
movements in the consumer price inflation rate
away from target, and movements in the
employment rate (an output gap measure) away
from target according to (12).
22 R(s,f,d) is the power of the rate of return (i.e. 1 plus
the rate). Hence, if the deposit rate for settlement
balances is 3 per cent, then R(CenB,DeposLoans,
ComB) = 1.03 and R(ComB,DeposLoans,CenB) = 1.035.
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(ii) Results
The shock is a 100 basis point increase in the
capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks. Via
the mechanisms described in Section II.iii, this
causes banks to undertake adjustments to the
composition of both the liability and asset sides
of their balance sheets. On the liability side, the
increase in the capital adequacy ratio causes
commercial banks to increase their issuance of
equity instruments, and decrease their reliance on
deposit and bond financing (Figure 1). On the asset
side of bank balance sheets, the rise in the capital
adequacy ratio induces commercial banks to
reduce their holdings of risky assets. In Figure 2
we see there is a decline in risk-weighted assets
relative to total bank financial assets. The decline
in risk-weighted assets is due to a shift in the
composition of bank asset holdings, away from
those with comparatively high risk weights (par-
ticularly foreign equity, industry equity) towards
those with lower risk weights (government bonds,
loans to non-reproducible housing).
As discussed above, the rise in the capital
adequacy ratio causes banks to raise additional
FIGURE 1
Outstanding Financing Instruments of the Commercial Banks (% Deviation from Baseline)
FIGURE 2
Financial Assets of Commercial Banks (% Deviation from Baseline)
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equity finance, and to reduce their demands for
deposit and loan finance (Figure 1). To per-
suade asset agents to acquire the new equity,
rates of return on bank equity must rise
(Figure 3). At the same time, banks reduce
their demand for loan and deposit finance,
allowing them to secure loan and deposit
financing at slightly lower rates of return
relative to baseline (Figure 3). Figure 4 reports
the deviation in the weighted average cost of
capital to commercial banks, which rises rela-
tive to baseline as banks increase the equity
share of their financing needs.
Figure 5 reports the deviations in the financial assets
and liabilities of commercial banks.23 As discussed in
Dixon et al. (2015), banks are assumed tooperate under
anenvironment of afixedmarginon the return they earn
on financial assets and the return theymust pay on their
financial liabilities. This has the effect of requiring the
commercial banks to pass on the increase in the cost of
their financial capital (Figure 4) to the agents to whom
FIGURE 3
Rates of Return (Powers thereof) on Bank Financing Instruments (% Deviation from Baseline)
FIGURE 4
Weighted Average Cost of Bank Capital (Basis Point Change from Baseline)
23 We assume that commercial bank physical assets
(primarily bank branches) are unaffected. Hence, in
Figure 5, the percentage deviation in financial assets
lies below the percentage deviation in liabilities.
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they lend.24 This reduces demand for loans from
commercial banks, that is, it leads to a contraction
in commercial bank ownership of financial assets
(Figure 5). Hence, commercial banks need to raise
less financial capital to acquire this smaller pool of
financial assets. That is, it leads to a contraction
in commercial bank financial liabilities (Figure 5).
Figure 6 reports the movement in the interest rates
that the central bank offers on settlement balance
deposits bycommercial banks, and charges commercial
banks for settlement balance loans. As discussed in
Section II.iv, the settlement balance deposit rate is
determined by a rule in which the central bank policy
rate responds to deviations in prices and unemployment
from target. The movements in the policy rate reported
in Figure 6 are small: a 0.6 basis point reduction in the
year the policy is implemented, with this rising to a 0.1
basis point positive deviation by the end of the
simulation period. This is close to simply maintaining
the baseline path for the policy rate. Figure 7 reports the
movements in the price level and the employment rate
that are driving, via the policy rule, the movements in
the policy rate reported in Figure 6. In the year the
capital adequacy ratio is increased, both the employ-
ment rate and the consumption price deflator fall
relative to baseline (Figure 7). This accounts for the
initial negative deviation in the policy rate (Figure 6).
Thereafter, both the consumption deflator and the
employment rate return to baseline. This accounts for
the returnof the policy rate towards baseline.By the end
of the simulation period, the employment rate has
returned to baseline, and the consumption price deflator
is slightly above baseline. This accounts for the small
positive deviation in the policy rate at the end of the
simulation period.25
As discussed in reference to Figure 2, the rise
in the capital adequacy ratio induces banks to
FIGURE 5
Financial Assets and Liabilities of the Commercial Banks (% Deviation from Baseline)
24 We can estimate the direct effect on the WACC by
noting that CAR = {EQUITY/RWA}={ASSETS/
RWA}{EQUITY/ASSETS}, where EQUITY, RWA
and ASSETS are bank equity, risk weighted assets
and total assets, respectively. Rearranging for the bank
equity financing share, EQUITY/ASSETS=
CAR{RWA/ASSETS}. The change in the equity share
is given by Δ{EQUITY/ASSETS} = [{RWA/
ASSETS}ΔCAR]+[{0.01EQUITY/ASSETS}%Δ
{RWA/ASSETS}]. The second term on the right-hand
side (RHS) contributes little (0.04 basis points
(bps)) to the change in the equity financing share: as
is clear from Figure 3, the percentage change (%Δ) in
the ratio RWA/ASSETS is small (0.25 per cent) and
so too is the equity financing share (0.16). The first term
on the RHS is the dominant factor, contributing 0.51
bps to the change in the equity share (ΔCAR = 0.01,
RWA/ASSETS = 0.51). With the cost of equity approx-
imately 800 bps higher than debt, the direct impact on
bank WACC is approximately 4 bps. The final impact
on bank WACC is lower (Figure 4) because investors
substitute to non-bank finance (Figure 12) and invest-
ment declines (Figure 10).
25 To put these numbers in context, typical Reserve
Bank of Australia adjustments in the policy rate are
articulated in terms of 25 basis point movements. The
deviation in the policy rate at the end of the period is
0.1 basis points. The positive deviation in the con-
sumption price index at the end of the simulation period
is approximately 0.002 per cent. This is like a realised
inflation outcome of 2.502 per cent when the target is
2.5 per cent.
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reduce lending to reproducible and non-repro-
ducible housing and industry. These agents can
substitute towards other sources of financial
capital, but their ability to do so is constrained.
Consequently, the reductions in bank lending
have implications for their capacity to finance
physical capital formation. This is clear from
Figure 8, which reports gross fixed capital
formation for housing and non-housing. Turning
to Table 2, the risk weight on lending to
reproducible housing is slightly higher than that
on lending to industry. This explains part of the
deeper negative deviation in housing investment
relative to non-housing investment in Figure 8.
However, another important factor is the ability
of housing and non-housing liability agents to
substitute away from bank finance. For housing
investment, opportunities in this regard are
limited: approximately half of the sector’s
capital formation is financed by bank lending,
with another third financed via household
equity. Outside of housing, bank financing
accounts for approximately a quarter of the
capital required to finance investment, with
other sources such as foreign markets and
domestic superannuation satisfying, respec-
tively, approximately one-third and one-tenth
of non-housing investment financing needs. As
is clear from Figure 8, with both components of
aggregate investment (i.e., both housing and
non-housing investment) below baseline, so too
is aggregate investment.
FIGURE 6
Movement in the Central Bank Deposit and Lending Rates for Settlement Balances (Basis Point Change from
Baseline)
FIGURE 7
Employment Rate and Private Consumption Deflator (Percentage Deviation from Baseline)
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Figure 9 reports deviations in real GDP,
employment, capital, and investment. In the
simulation’s first year, the physical capital stock
cannot change from baseline. However, a small
negative employment deviation in the simula-
tion’s first year generates a small negative devi-
ation in real GDP in that year. Thereafter,
employment gradually returns to baseline. How-
ever, the negative deviation in real investment
causes the aggregate capital stock to fall relative
to baseline (Figure 9). This causes a negative
deviation in GDP in the medium to longer term of
the order of 0.005 per cent, despite the return of
employment to baseline.
Figure 10 reports real GDP, real gross national
expenditure (GNE), and the components of real
GNE (private and public consumption, and
investment). As is clear from Figure 10, the real
GNE deviation lies below the real GDP deviation.
This is due to the negative deviation in real
investment. As discussed above, the increase in
the capital adequacy ratio causes bank lending to
industry and housing to fall relative to baseline.
As can be seen in Figure 10, the resulting falls in
dwelling and non-dwelling investment cause the
aggregate investment deviation to lie below the
real GDP deviation. This contributes to the GNE
deviation lying below the real GDP deviation.
FIGURE 8
Housing and Non-housing Investment, and Economy-wide Investment (% Deviation from Baseline)
FIGURE 9
Real GDP, Employment, Capital Stock and Real Investment (% Deviation from Baseline)
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With the real GNE deviation lying below the
real GDP deviation, we expect the real balance of
trade to move towards surplus. This is confirmed
by Figure 11, where we see a positive deviation
in export volumes and a negative deviation in
import volumes. The positive deviation in export
volumes generates a negative deviation in the
terms of trade because exporters must lower the
foreign currency prices of their commodities to
support the expansion in export volumes. The
negative deviation in the terms of trade has
consequences for real private consumption.
Returning to Figure 10, we see that the deviation
in real private consumption is below the deviation
in real GDP. This is due to the decline in the
terms of trade. In modelling consumption, we
assume that nominal private consumption is a
fixed proportion of nominal national income.
Under this specification, a decline in the terms
of trade dampens private consumption relative to
real GDP. This reinforces the impact of the
negative investment deviation on the gap between
the GNE and GDP deviations.
Figure 12 explores the implications of reduced
bank lending for the composition of the liability
side of the model’s two capital creating agents:
industry and reproducible housing. As is clear
from Figure 12, the balance sheets of both sectors
shift away from loan finance towards equity and
(in the case of industry) bond finance. This
FIGURE 10
Real GDP, Real GNE, and the Components of Real GNE (% Deviation from Baseline)
FIGURE 11
Export Volumes, Import Volumes and the Terms of Trade (% Deviation from Baseline)
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suggests a second avenue via which the rise in the
capital adequacy ratio potentially improves finan-
cial stability. Not only are banks encouraged to
finance a greater proportion of their operations
via equity, but by raising the cost of bank debt
finance, households are encouraged to finance a
greater proportion of their stake in the housing
sector via equity, and industries are encouraged to
finance a greater proportion of their gross fixed
capital formation via equity and bonds.
IV Conclusions and Future Work
Prudential regulators in Australia and many
other countries monitor and regulate the propor-
tion of commercial bank activities financed by
equity. Their concern is to ensure that banks have
sufficient loss-absorbing capital to maintain
financial system resilience in the event of adverse
shocks to individual banks or the banking system
as a whole. Their aim is to avoid in the future
economic damage of the magnitudes experienced
by advanced economies following the 2008
financial crisis. But can the raising of commercial
bank capital adequacy impose its own macroeco-
nomic costs? We investigated this by examining
the effects of a 100 basis point increase in the
capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks. We
found that this has modest macroeconomic
impacts while securing a rise in bank equity, a
shift in bank lending away from housing invest-
ment, a rise in household equity financing of
home ownership, and a rise in equity and bond
financing of capital formation by industry.
While our results suggest that regulators have
some latitude to raise mandated capital
requirements without risking significant macroe-
conomic disruption, the qualifications and limi-
tations of our modelling must be noted. As
discussed in Section II, the level of aggregation
of our agents in the model’s financial side,
particularly the capital-forming industry and
dwelling agents, could obscure subsectors where
bank financing availability is a binding con-
straint. Sector-specific bottlenecks can augment
the consequences of policy change (see Dixon
et al., 2011), raising the possibility that the
impact of raising bank CAR could be higher than
modelled in this paper. Adverse wealth effects,
particularly through the impacts of reduced bank
lending on house prices, and possibly also
through the impact on bank equity prices of
additional bank equity issuance, are another
potential avenue via which our modelling might
understate the macro effects of higher CAR. A
possibility in the other direction is the effect of
credit risk perceptions on the cost of bank debt
finance, particularly in international wholesale
markets. While our finding of only a modest
impact on bank WACC from raising CAR is
close, quantitatively, to the predictions of
Modigliani and Miller, the Modigliani–Miller
theorem is not an explicit part of our modelling,
and so we might overstate the impact of higher
CAR on bank WACC, and thus so too on
investment and other macro variables.
We plan to explore the above caveats in five
ways. First, while the model is already highly
disaggregated, with five financial instruments, 11
financial agents, and 106 production sectors,
further disaggregation will expand the range of
FIGURE 12
Equity and Debt of Industry and Reproducible Housing (% Deviation from Baseline)
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potential model applications and also elucidate
some of the caveats outlined above. For example,
we currently assume that the financial capital
needed by the 106 industries of the model’s real
side is raised by two representative financial
agents (industry and RH). In future work, we plan
to identify each of the model’s 106 industries as
financial agents in their own right. This will give
each industry its own unique capital structure.
This could reveal industries where bank capital is
a binding constraint. Identification of industries
that are particularly sensitive to bank finance
restrictions might raise the magnitude of the
economy-wide impacts of a rise in CAR. More
importantly, it will expand the model’s capacity
to explore how the costs and benefits of monetary
policy and financial regulation are distributed
across industries. By identifying the regions in
which industries are located, thus allowing
recognition of industry- and region-specific dif-
ferences in capital structure, such a model could
also elucidate the regional consequences of
monetary and financial policy. Further disaggre-
gation in the model’s risk weights could also be
explored. Consistent with the aggregation of our
financial agents, the model currently identifies 11
risk weight bands (Table 2), based on the approx-
imately 50 bands identified in Australian Pruden-
tial Regulatory Authority (2013). Further
disaggregation would not only allow the model
to elucidate finer levels of industrial (and possibly
regional) impacts from higher CAR, but also
potentially facilitate model development to
explore the consequences of higher CAR induc-
ing banks to undertake within-band substitution
towards higher risk assets.
Second, we expect that further development of
the model’s NRH sector, particularly the deter-
minants of NRH prices, has the potential to reveal
connections between bank lending and house
prices. This will open the possibility of exploring
adverse wealth effects via CAR affecting house
prices.26 This would motivate further develop-
ment of the model’s valuation terms. As noted in
Section II.ii, the model contains a full set of
valuation terms (V(s,f,d)), but theory governing
movements in these terms currently covers indus-
try, RH and NRH equity, and exchange-rate
driven movements in domestic currency values
of foreign assets. In future work, we plan to
endogenise the valuation terms on the equity of
pure financial intermediaries. This would allow,
for example, bank equity valuations to be sensi-
tive to mortgage defaults in an environment of
rising unemployment or falling house prices.
Third, we plan to model investors as sensitive
to bank risk and thus potentially willing to lend
and supply equity at lower required rates of return
as bank CAR rises. For the current application,
we expect this to reduce the magnitude of the
modelled impacts of a rise in CAR. We also
expect it to expand the range of potential future
model applications (e.g. the consequences of
heightened perceptions of bank risk on the part
of foreign creditors).
Fourth, in this paper our simulations are
concerned with investigating the economic costs
of raising capital adequacy ratios, while taking as
given the idea that financial regulators have a
considered view on the benefits, in terms of
financial stability, of a given increase in capital
requirements. In future work, we expect to
investigate the impact on financial stability of
changes in the share of equity in commercial bank
financing. To do this, we will need to develop the
model further, embedding theory explaining how
financial stability is affected by changes in
equity–debt financing ratios in both commercial
banking and housing finance. The aim will be to
model factors that can quickly affect financial
stability, such as bank runs, or rapid house price
deflation. Modelling of the former is likely to
require explicit modelling of how the willingness
of asset agents to hold commercial bank deposits
is a function of perceived bank stability, with one
input to these perceptions being the margin of
remaining loss-absorbing capital. Modelling of
the latter is likely to require explicit modelling of
real estate bubbles, with a link between asset
price growth and commercial bank lending activ-
ity.
The fifth direction of model development will
be in the description of the relationship between
central bank announcements and the behaviour of
financial market participants. In the current
model, the central bank affects changes in the
policy rate through open market operations. This
is consistent with descriptions of central bank
activity that give open market operations a central
place in maintaining the policy rate near target.
However, another possibility is that central bank
rate announcements induce market participants to
take actions that adjust rates in the direction
26 For example, Engelhardt (1996) finds a positive
relationship between household savings rates and neg-
ative house price shocks (but no relationship between
savings rates and positive house price shocks).
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desired by the central bank, thus reducing the
short-run need for open market operations.
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